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Richfield (hereinafter "Richfield" or plaintiff).
ARGUM E MT

I.

DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BEING IN ACTUAL
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE AS DEFENDANT WAS A PASSIVE
OCCUPANT, MERELY USING HIS VEHICLE AS A PLACE TO SLEEP,

actual physical control of a veh icle wh i ] e i inder the inf] i lence of

i n significant respects from the case at bar

In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court found that there was
actual physical control when the defendant was positioned In the
driverfs seat behind the steering wheel with possession of the
ignition key.

Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah

1982) . Although defendant in Garcia was unable to move his car
because of its position between a fence and a parked car,
defendant was in the driverfs seat and had exclusive control of
the ignition key. £d.
In Lopez, the defendant was again seated in the driver's
seat, with his head resting on the steering wheel and the keys in
the ignition.

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 773, 779 (Utah

1986) . The arresting officer had to turn the keys in order to
remove them from the ignition. Lopez. 720 P. 2d at 779. The
Utah Supreme Court noted that "[positioning in the driver's seat
is an element common to all of the cases that have found actual
physical control of a motionless vehicle.11
780.

Lopez, 720 P.2d at

The court went on to say that in negating a claim of actual

physical control, the focus is on the status of the occupant, not
that of the vehicle*

Id.

In both Lope2 and Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed
its definition of actual physical control as being "present
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation."
State v. Bugger. 483 P.2d 442f 443 (Utah 1971).

The Lopez court

expressly negated a comparison by the Lopez defendant to that of
the defendant in Bugger, stating that "Nothing in that case
[Bugger] indicates that the driver was in the driver's seat at
2

the time he was found and arrested."

Lopez. 720 P.2d at 780.

However, the defendants position in this case was analogous
to that of the defendant in Bugger.

In both this case and

Bugger, the defendants were asleep in their cars, lying down on
the seat, their vehicles removed from the traveled portion of the
highway, and the motors were not running.

As nothing in Bugger

indicated that the defendant was in the driver's seat at the time
he was arrested, the same is true in this case.

Therefore, as in

Bugger, the defendant in this case is not guilty of being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.
It is recognized that acts short of starting a vehicle can
be held to constitute actual physical control, but it w . . .
requires that a person be in the driver's seat of .a vehicle,
behind the steering wheel, in possession of the ignition key, and
in such a condition that he is physically capable of starting the
engine and causing the vehicle to move."

Garcia, 645 P.2d at

645, citing 351 N.E.2d 85 at 87 (emphasis added).

Here, the

defendant was not in such a condition that he was physically
capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move.
II.

DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER RICHFIELD CITY
ORDINANCE 1983-2 BECAUSE IT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM UTAH
STATUTORY LAW AND THUS IS INVALID.
The trial court was correct in holding that the Richfield

City ordinance was consistent with state law at the time it was
adopted.

R. Memorandum Decision 87-TF-1140 at 5.

The trial

court also ruled correctly that the ordinance did not adopt in

3

1976. by r e f e r e n c e , t h e e n t i r e Utah T r a f f i c Code, including a l l
subsequent amendments.

Id.

However, the t r i a l court d i d not properly rule on the e f f e c t
o f R i c h f i e l d 1 s f a i l u r e t o adopt t h o s e subsequent amendments, as
R i c h f i e l d was allowed t o prosecute under t h e ordinance in
question.
An ordinance adopted by a local authority
that governs a person's operating or being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having alcohol in the blood or while
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug, or that governs, in relation to any of
those matters, use of a chemical test or
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions,
or penalties, or that governs any combination
of those matters, shall be consistent with
the provisions in this code which govern
those matters.
Utah Code Ann.

41-6-43(1) (emphasis added).

This mandates that all local ordinances be consistent with
the provisions of the Utah Code.

Therefore, a local government

is without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in
conflict with, state statutory laws.

Salt Lake City v. Allred,

20 Utah 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968).
The Richfield ordinance is in direct conflict with state
statute.

Richfield ordinance 1983-2

1.2 does not provide for

measurement of grams of alcohol in breath, as does state statute.
See Utah Code Ann.

41-6-44(2).

-It provides only for measurement

of alcohol in the blood.
The penalty for a first conviction under the Richfield
ordinance differs significantly from the penalty for a same
4

conviction under state statute.

Richfieldfs ordinance provides

for a first conviction penalty of not less than sixty days nor
more than six months.

Richfield Ordinance 1983-2

1.3.

For the

same conviction under state statute, the penalty is not less than
forty-eight nor more than 240 consecutive hours.
41-6-44(4).

Utah Code Ann.

However, the state statute aandates that the minimum

period of two days be imposed, while the Richfield ordinance
allows for full suspension of the jail term.
The state statute also enhances the penalty for a second or
third conviction.

The Richfield ordinance leaves such decisions

within the discretion of the judge.
The state statue addresses the concept that additional, or
stronger, penalties are warranted, but the state also mandates a
city's compliance so that a uniform treatment of
the influence11 will be achieved.

,f

driver under

In deviating from the state

statute, the city of Richfield has decided to walk a different
path, in violation of the enabling statute U.C.A. 41-6-43.
Richfield's ordinance intrudes into an area preempted by
comprehensive legislation by the Utah State Legislature.

This

comprehensive legislation was intended to blanket the area of
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, as well as
being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence.
invalid.

As such, the Richfield ordinance-must be held

State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION

Under the Utah Supreme Court's definition of "actual

5

physical control", the defendant was improperly convicted of
such.

That conviction was sustained under a city ordinance that

is in direct conflict with Utah state law.

Therefore,

defendants conviction should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Sheldc
Attorney for Ap'pellant
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